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THE UNITED STATES ARMY AS A
CONSTABULARY ON THE NORTHERN PLAINS

LARRY D. BALL

With the formation of the United States military establishment in the late eighteenth century, the new army undertook many services in
the developing republic, including several associated with the frontier movement. While the
army considered the suppression of hostile Indians its primary mission in the West, its soldiers
routinely supported civilian law enforcement
authorities. After the Civil War, white criminals accompanied other American frontiersmen onto the northern Plains, where white
desperadoes soon posed a serious problem. In
the late 1870s they descended upon the Black

Hills mining camps and looted stagecoaches in
alarming numbers; brazenly robbed Union Pacific trains and threatened to disrupt their schedules; plundered Sioux, Arapahoe, and other
Indian horse herds as well as those of white
settlers; and even preyed upon military property. This lawless onslaught threatened to
overwhelm the nascent law enforcement agencies of Wyoming, Dakota, and neighboring
districts. Had the United States Army not
reinforced the county sheriffs and United States
marshals, this frontier crime wave of the 1870s
might have been worse.
United States forces began to participate in
civilian law enforcement with the formation of
the Union. While the Founding Fathers believed that the army's primary task was the
defense of the nation again external enemies,
the Constitution also called on the federal
government to "insure domestic tranquility."
At the same time the Federalist and Jeffersonian
Republican parties, which played the primary
role in formulating this peace-keeping doctrine,
rightly feared excessive military intrusion into
civilian law enforcement. The 1792 Congress
prescribed circumstances for the president to
call state militias into federal service and dis-
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patch them to the assistance of civilian lawmen,
and the 1807 Congress extended this obligation
to the regular army. The military could assume
law enforcement powers only when a federal
judge, state governor, or state legislature informed the president of the United States that
lawless elements had overwhelmed civil authority and resisted all legal means to suppress
them. Congress also legislated specific peacekeeping assignments to the army, such as the
expulsion of white intruders from public lands
and the prevention of violations of the nation's
borders.!
The frontier army carried out a sizeable range
of law enforcement duties since territorial governments lacked the population necessary to
support strong peace-keeping machinery. The
bluecoats devoted much of their time to the less
than satisfying duty of serving in the posses of
frontier sheriffs and United States marshals.
The Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts, regulating relations between the two races in the
West, mandated such constabulary activities.
The Intercourse Act of 1834, which codified
the preceding fifty years of miliary experience
on the frontier, authorized the army to police
that region designated as Indian Country against
illicit whiskey traders and other white lawbreakers. If United States marshals-the executive officers of the federal court system-were
present, the regulars assisted them to make
arrests. In the absence of marshals the soldiers
made their own arrests and turned their prisoners over to the nearest civil magistrate. 2
The deepening slavery crisis in the midnineteenth century expanded the civil employment of United States soldiers. Abolitionist
mobs often overpowered United States marshals as the latter attempted to arrest and transport runaway slaves to their southern owners. In
order to provide the federal lawmen with immediate and dependable support, the federal government sought to shortcut the time-consuming process established by Congress. In 1854
United States Attorney General Caleb Cushing
liberalized the definition of the posse comitatus.
In the Anglo-American law enforcement tradi-

tion, peace officers possessed the authority to
summon able-bodied male citizens as possemen.
Cushing broadened the meaning of the
"possemen" to include any federal military forces
stationed within the lawman's jurisdiction. The
United States forces-either army or navy-were
part of, not separate from, the posse comitatus,
declared the ingenious attorney general. While
Cushing rendered this opinion for the benefit of
federal lawmen in the East, his decision indirectly came to the aid of frontier peacekeepers
by providing them with immediate access to
military garrisons. In the remote frontier regions civilian officers could proceed to the
nearest fort and obtain blue coated possemen
without delay.3
Soldiers serving as constabulary on the northern Plains put in an appearance shortly after
frontiersmen began the trek to Oregon and
California in the 1840s. For more than a quarter
of a century, the army provided the westwardmoving pioneers with many services, including
protection not only from hostile Indians but
also from lawless whites who preyed upon the
wagon trains. When Union forces imposed
martial law upon the overland trail during the
Civil War, army officers also provided a justice
system for travelers. And when the Union
Pacific Railroad began to lay track across the
Plains, the bluecoats temporarily policed the
new rail communities, such as Cheyenne, Wyoming. Since the white population of Wyoming
and neighboring regions grew very slowly and
both county and federal law enforcement remained rudimentary in the 1870s, the military,
according to historian Raymond Welty, "represented the [only] power of established order" on
the northern Plains. 4
BANDITS IN THE BLACK HILLS

The discovery of gold in the Black Hills in
1874 and the subsequent rush to exploit this orebearing region of western Dakota and eastern
Wyoming increased the necessity for a military
constabulary. The soldiers were called upon to
perform contradictory assignments. First, they
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were ordered to prevent gold seekers from intruding upon the Black Hills, Indian treaty
lands. Failing to stem the flow of prospectors, in
1875 the bluecoats shifted their emphasis to
protecting the interlopers. Soon the entire
region surrounding the Hills bustled with thousands of people searching for fortunes. Naturally the lawless flotsam and jetsam of the
frontier soon began to prey upon the miners in
Deadwood and other camps.
Cheyenne, the Wyoming capital, was the
most important entrepot for the new economic
paradise. The village lay on the Union Pacific
Railroad some three hundred miles south of
Deadwood, which became the most important
Black Hills <;amp. Highway robbers became an
especial problem on the Cheyenne-Deadwood
highway and other roads leading into the region. The more reckless bandits began to
threaten Union Pacific trains. Other desperadoes lowered their sights and supplied the hungry mining camps with stolen livestock, particularly horses from the large Indian herds on
reservations convenient to the Hills camps.
Raiders also targeted army livestock and payroll
wagons. 5
The size and composition of both robber
bands and pursuing military units varied considerably. Outlaw groups were, at best, temporary
alliances of convenience. Duncan Blackburn's
aggregation consisted of five men, while Big
Nose George Parrott led six freebooters and Joel
Collins and Sam Bass together the same number. Even Jesse and Frank James reportedly put
in an appearance in the Black Hills. After
capturing five outlaws in 1877, the army found
the written "constitution" of a large horsethief
operation in the camp. Each member had been
assigned a number in place of his name. The
existence of several small bands of robbers in the
region at the same time aggravated the problems of capture. After a robbery, the highwaymen often separated into smaller units to thwart
their pursuers. The pursuing military detachments also varied in size-from two-man escorts
for stagecoaches to ten- and twenty-man units
on the chase. Although they were hunting for
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outlaws, these larger patrols were necessary in
the event of a chance encounter with hostile
Indians. 6
REGULARS TO THE RESCUE

In the absence of established civilian communities, the military installations in and around
the Black Hills proved invaluable substitutes in
the search for order. With Fort Laramie, Wyoming, as a hub, these posts often dispatched
units of infantry or cavalry in a timely fashion
against lawless whites and provided many services to sheriffs and United States marshals. In
addition to gathering intelligence about the
movements of American desperadoes, the forts
provided lawmen with food, sleeping quarters,
guns and ammunition, hospital care, and even
horses. Army guardhouses substituted for county
jails, which were often insecure or nonexistent.
While pursuing outlaws in July 1877, Deputy
Sheriff Thomas F. Talbott of Cheyenne enjoyed a generous reception at Fort Sanders, near
Laramie, Wyoming. Post Commander A. G.
Brackett "furnished fresh horses, rations, and
everything needed for a hard, long ride," recalled the grateful lawman, "and [Brackett] was
sorry he could not do more." In tum, sheriffs and
marshals often deputized civilian employees on
the strategically placed military posts. 7
The pursuit of American livestock thieves
became a common, if frustrating, duty of the
regulars. In their efforts to satisfy the market for
horses and cattle in new gold camps, the American rustlers pillaged the herds of the Indians,
army, and even newly arrived settlers. Some
white inhabitants who did not inquire as to the
source of the animals shielded these pilferers
from the authorities. In December 1878 General George Crook said that rustlers from western Nebraska had stolen the surprising number
of two thousand ponies from the Red Cloud and
Spotted Tail reservations in the previous two
years. In March 1877 Major C. H. Carlton,
Commandant of Fort Fetterman, Wyoming,
reported the presence of several camps of desperadoes between the Laramie Mountains and
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the Platte River. Carlton confessed, however,
that his attempts to surprise the camps "have so
far been unsuccessful," since local ranchers
abetted the evildoers. In neighboring Dakota
Territory Third Cavalry personnel pursued a
band of Americans who had stolen Indian livestock. While the soldiers recovered fifty head of
livestock in the village of Spearfish, the townspeople protected the thieves. 8
The soldiers both won and lost in their ongoing efforts to suppress the raiders. After the
theft of ponies from the Red Cloud Agency in
Dakota Territory, in February 1877, cavalrymen from Fort Laramie overtook the rustlers
and captured two of them as they drove the
stolen animals toward Nebraska. The Fort's
post returns reported almost monthly sorties
against white rustlers through the spring and
summer of 1877. In March of that year, troops
from Camp Robinson, Nebraska, ran down two
rustlers and stopped over at Fort Fetterman,
Wyoming, where, according to the post returns,
"Nearly, if not all of the [stolen] ponies were
recovered." The pursuit of desperadoes was
dangerous. In March of 1876, Arapahoe Chief
Black Cole appealed for military assistance
against the raids of a notorious horse thief,
William F. Chambers, alias Persimmon Bill.
When Sergeant Patrick Sullivan and a detachment of the Fort Fetterman garrison caught up
with the outlaw leader, Bill treacherously shot
and killed Sullivan. 9
The Army was also sometimes the victim of
the outlaws. Army payrolls constituted one of
the largest concentrations of hard currency in
the wilderness and tempted white highwaymen.
In August 1877 the Cheyenne Daily Leader reported that soldiers had arrested a notorious
thief at Camp Stambaugh after he had boasted
about his plans to rob the army paymaster. A
saloon keeper near Fort Laramie overheard criminals planning another such raid and informed
local lawmen. In February 1879 Big Nose
George Parrott and his gang stopped the army
paymaster's escort near Terry, Montana. By a
stroke of good fortune, the paymaster had already disposed of his funds, but the bandits took
$3200 from a civilian merchant in the party.lO

ORDER IN THE MINING CAMPS

The bluecoats also provided assistance to
lawmen in the Black Hills mining camps. Because Dakota Territory had failed to provide a
legal county government for the Hills until
1877, the miners were constrained to employ
extra-legal forms of government. The residents
of Deadwood selected Seth Bullock, a veteran of
the Montana mining boom, as "de facto sheriff,"
but the energetic Bullock could not enforce the
laws alone. In November 1877 workers occupied the Keets Mine and refused to vacate until
back wages were paid. Seth Bullock, by now a
legal sheriff, called upon Acting Governor
George H. Hand, who in turn requested the
assistance of General Phil Sheridan, in Omaha,
Nebraska. On 12 November 1877, Hand telegraphed the sheriff, "Have requested President
to have soldiers cooperate with you." When the
bluecoats arrived, the sheriff's posse and soldiers
blockaded the mine shaft and smoked out the
angry laborers with sulfur fumes. Upon receiving news of this surrender, Governor Hand
expressed his appreciation to Sheriff Bullock for
"the energy, faithfulness and discretion you
have shown in this matter." Whether or not the
workers received their wages is not shown in the
accounts of this episode. ll
PROTECTING THE STAGE ROUTE

While the local authorities were usually able
to maintain some order within the mining camps,
the hinterlands were much less secure. Prospectors, businessmen, freighters, and the ruffian
element that always descended upon mining
camps soon jammed the Cheyenne-Deadwood
highway. The Cheyenne and Black Hills Stage
Company, which began operations in 1876,
made the most persistent demands for army
protection. While military personnel occasionally patrolled this and other highways against
Indians, in April 1877 the Cheyenne Daily Leader
reported that General Crook planned to assign
more companies to protect the Black Hills
highway. Crook, who was touring the region at
this time, told the Daily Leader that his soldiers
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would be able to provide "perfect security" for
the areaY
Defeating the unpredictable and elusive highwaymen proved more difficult than the general
had envisioned. The army established three
encampments along the Black Hills road and
posted mounted escorts where robbers or Indians were suspected of lying in wait, but the
bandits quickly spied out the routine of the
cavalrymen and moved to other, unprotected
sections of the road. In a letter to a superior,
Major A. W. Evans of Fort Laramie observed
that placing his men "at any point on the road
would not prevent the coach [from] being
stopped ten or twenty miles on either side" of
his patrol areas. 13
As the number of stagecoach robberies increased to at least twenty-two in 1877-78, the
Cheyenne and Black Hills Stage Company demanded additional protection, but the army
found this firm as unpredictable as the outlaws
and very difficult to satisfy. When bandits
robbed three coaches in June 1877, Luke
Voorhees, the company superintendent, informed federal officials in Washington that he
could no longer guarantee the security of the
mail on his coaches unless the army established
more encampments on the Black Hills road.
When General Crook issued the necessary orders, the company replied by requesting yet
another increase of military forces. On 20 June
1877 Superintendent Voorhees telegraphed
Major Evans and asked for two soldiers to ride in
each coach, presumably in addition to the horse
guards. Again, General Crook complied with
the company's wishes and instructed Major
Evans to "Furnish an infantry guard to go with
each stage on such parts of the mail route from
your post to Deadwood as the proprietors of the
mail line may wish."14
In spite of the military's efforts to meet the
express company's demands, the company curiously failed to cooperate with the soldiers. Since
each military guard inside a coach displaced a
paying traveler, the stage line reserved the right
to refuse seats to the troopers. Again, General
Crook's office took this unusual and self-defeating act into consideration. The general's orders

to Captain A. W. Moore, on 20 July 1877, to
place "two dismounted men ... on [each] coach
going up" the Black Hills road, included the
qualification "if there be room" on the coach.
When bandits robbed a coach three days later,
Lieutenant Campbell, a supervisor of the guards,
reported "Soldiers not on coach, last night."
There was "no room for them," he added.l5
PROTECTING THE RAILROAD

The army extended escort services to the
Union Pacific Railroad in 1878, as highwaymen
began to threaten the critical rail link with the
Pacific Coast. The editor of the Daily Leader
reacted indignantly to threats against the railroad, "the great national highway." As early as
1876, bandits stopped an express train at Percy
Station in western Wyoming, and two years
later the ever-active Big Nose George Parrott
planned a robbery near this same place. Although the authorities thwarted him, the outlaws murdered two deputy sheriffs who had
inadvertently stumbled upon their camp.16
On 13 September 1878, First Lieutenant
Theodore C. True, Adjutant at Fort Sanders,
Wyoming, issued the necessary orders "to protect the U. S. mails and passenger trains en route
over the U. P. R. R. from Rock Springs to Carter
Station." While intelligence sources reported
at least two separate bands of train robbers
lurking in the vicinity of Rock Springs, the
presence of the military evidently discouraged
them. As a general rule, frontier outlaws were
discreet enough to avoid heavily guarded rail
cars and stagecoaches and were content with
the more modest spoils from lightly defended
vehicles. Like the Cheyenne and Black Hills
Company officials, Union Pacific executives
soon began to make additional demands. Although the official purpose of the military guard
was to protect the mail cars, Superintendent
Snow of the Laramie Division became concerned about the vulnerability of trains stopped
for meals at remote stations in western Wyoming, so military authorities directed the troops
to protect train and passengers at lonely stations. 17
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SOLDIERS' OBJECTIONS, SUCCESSES, AND
FAILURES

The professional soldiers often objected to
these constabulary assignments. Not only did
they dislike serving under civilian lawmen, but
they feared malicious law suits from the local
population and anticipated opposition in Congress. If they were ordered to perform such
unwelcome duties, the soldiers preferred active
pursuit of desperadoes in the field to passive
guard and escort tasks. In the field they could at
least put some training into effect and sometimes score a victory against the outlaws. In
June 1877 Major A. W. Evans of Fort Laramie
voiced objections to guard duty on the Black
Hills stage coaches and complained that "the
cure"--pursuit and capture of outlaws--was far
superior to mere "prevention". In the previous
month, one of Major Evans's units had captured
four members of a large robber band. Later in
the year Lieutenant George F. Chase and a
Third Cavalry detachment captured two bandits, who had unwisely robbed a coach only
three miles from Fort Laramie. After an eightyfive mile ride, Chase "gave the order for the
charge" and opened fire within twenty yards of
the fugitives. The two outlaws, John F. Babcock
and Fonce Ryan, quickly surrendered. The
Cheyenne Daily Leader observed the lieutenant
and his men riding into the territorial capital on
"weary and mud-bespattered horses" with their
prisoners in tow. As Chase turned over his
captives to the sheriff, this newspaperman concluded that these blue coated manhunters deserved "Great credit" for their efforts. 18
The frontier army made a more significant
contribution in the pursuit of highwaymen who
robbed a Union Pacific train at Big Springs,
Nebraska, in September 1877. Texas cowboys
Joel Collins and Sam Bass and their gang were
fresh from an unsuccessful series of holdups and
at least one murder in the Black Hills when they
robbed the train of $60,000 in gold coin and set
off a massive manhunt. On 25 September,
General George Crook ordered his troops to

enter the fray and, since the desperadoes had
fled southward toward their home state, alerted
General John Pope, Commander of the Department of the Missouri, in Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas. Pope threw out a cordon of forces along
the Kansas Pacific Railroad to intercept the
robbers. On 26 September a detachment of the
16th Infantry shot and killed two suspects who
resisted arrest at Buffalo Station, a small water
stop in Ellis County, Kansas. The dead men
proved to be gang leader Joel Collins and Bill
Hefferidge. The infantrymen recovered eighty
pounds of gold worth an estimated $22,000. 19
Such successes did not reconcile the bluecoats
to constabulary chores. They received no additional pay for chasing dangerous outlaws whose
vicious threats against the soldiers may have
tended to unnerve the young, inexperienced
recruits. During a difficult winter chase through
the mountains of Wyoming in November 1877,
a unit of cavalrymen gave up the hunt for what
some observers believed insufficient reasons.
The horsemen claimed that their mounts were
exhausted, but Scott Davis, the experienced
express company detective leading the posse,
continued on alone through a severe blizzard.
After Davis arrested Duncan Blackburn, one of
the most notorious outlaw leaders, an angry
Wyoming newspaperman was moved to accuse
the military of "mutiny". A report later circulated that the army had initiated court martial
proceedings against its errant possemen. 20
Scott Davis had an even more upsetting
experience with two military guards when bandits struck his treasure coach in eastern Wyoming on 26 September 1877. A fierce gunfight
terrified the troops, who refused to defend the
coach. They "sprang out, leaving their guns
inside, and ran away," Davis reported, "one of
them putting his hands over his face and yelling
with fright." When Davis was wounded and the
attackers took possession of the coach, the
panicky soldiers "came running back to the
coach, crying, 'we give up, we give up.'" One
Wyoming newspaperman accused the soldiers
of a lack of "sand" and concluded that, had the
enlisted men held their ground, the coach could
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have been successfully defended. No records of
court martial proceedings against these soldiers
have been found. 21
In other instances, the possibility of earning
reward money may have stimulated military
possemen. Although some question arose about
the eligibility of the troops to receive bounties,
the authorities apparently resolved the matter
in favor of the soldiers. In August 1877, Luke
Voorhees informed the commander at Fort
Laramie that his company "will give you $1000
to catch [the] men." Hugh Lenox, a young
lieutenant on the scout for hostile Indians in the
Black Hills about this time, encountered several men who were acting suspiciously but he let
them pass. When a sheriff's posse overtook the
column shortly thereafter, Lenox learned the
men were fugitives with a $5,000 reward for
their capture. "I had had them in my hands with
two troops of cavalry to help hold them," Lenox
recalled dejectedly.zz
The Union Pacific Railroad posted a $10,000
reward for the Joel Collins band in September
1877. E. R. Platt, assistant adjutant, Department of the Missouri, reminded the Fort Hays
commandant that "your men engaged in capturing robbers are clearly entitled to a portion of
the reward," adding, "You should secure it for
them." When a dispute arose between the
sheriff of Ellis County, Kansas, and the soldiers
about who had killed the outlaw leader, Joel
Collins, and his comrade, the Fort Hays commander wrote to S. H. H. Clark, general superintendent of the Union Pacific, urging him to
withhold any reward payments "until an application is duly filed for the men of the detachment of this post." The outcome of the soldiers'
claim is unknown, but in another instance,
Lieutenant George Chase, who captured two
robbers in Wyoming, received a $400 rewardY
THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT

In the midst of this constabulary effort on the
northern Plains, lawmakers in Washington suddenly accorded the professional soldiers what
they had desired all along, relief from many law

enforcement activities. In June 1878 Congress,
responding to several interest groups, abruptly
forbade federal military personnel from serving
in the posse comitatus. The Democrats had
been angered at the use of troops to enforce
revenue and election laws in the Reconstruction South, while the labor movement resented
the employment of troops to suppress the Great
Railway Strike of 1877. The army also regularly
protested that the excessive demand for troopers as law officers distracted the soldiers from
their primary peacetime duty-training for war.
Congress responded by enacting the Posse
Comitatus Act, which prohibited United States
marshals and county sheriffs from calling directly upon the nearest military post and summoning troops for their posses. Such easy access
had been a boon to frontier peace officers, who
had neither the time nor the inclination to
make a formal written application for soldiers
through the governor and United States authorities. Congress provided for a fine of up to
$10,000 or two years imprisonment for any
military personnel disobeying the new, more
restrictive policy.24
The Posse Comitatus Act threw frontier
authorities into temporary disarray. From the
Black Hills to New Mexico and Arizona, army
personnel were immediately recalled from civil
posses, and General of the Army William T.
Sherman assured Congress that "the army is
being guided by the strict letter" of the law.
When United States Senator Algernon Paddock of Nebraska requested military aid for
sheriffs against white horse thieves who continued to raid the Sioux reservation herds, Sherman
declined. He reminded the lawmaker that "Our
officers don't usually have $10,000 handy" to
pay the fine. Sherman could have added that his
officers also feared law suits. In the nineteenth
century, many Americans-anxious to protect
the sanctity of republican institutions from
military incursions-resorted to the courts to
protect cherished freedoms. 25
Frontier officials deplored the abrupt withdrawal of military forces from civilian posses.
On 10 September 1878, Wyoming Governor
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John Wesley Hoyt reminded the secretary of
war that he still needed military assistance
against criminals and urged the secretary to
intercede with the president. This is an "emergency," said the worried territorial executive.
The Cheyenne Daily Leader mocked Congress
for tying the hands of government while the
Deadwood Black Hills Daily Times even asked,
"Have We a Government?" Jay Gould, president of the Union Pacific Railroad, made a
special trip to Washington to lobby for relief
from the Posse Comitatus Act, but an effort by
Senator Algernon Paddock and other western
officials to persuade Congress to exempt the
frontier states and territories failed.2 6
The Posse Comitatus Act, however, turned
out to be less restrictive than westerners had
first believed. After several cabinet meetings in
September and October 1878, President
Rutherford B. Hayes and his advisers concluded
that there were exemptions. The law did not
interfere with the president's power to proclaim
a domestic emergency and make troops available to civil lawmen. While the banditry in the
Black Hills did not require a presidential proclamation, Hayes did proclaim an emergency
and called out troops to suppress a bloody New
Mexico feud in October 1878. The Posse
Comitatus Act also did not affect the right of
the army to protect the national boundary and
all public property, including the United States
mails, enabling soldiers to ride the mail cars on
Union Pacific trains. No doubt the plea of
railroad baron Jay Gould had something to do
with the frantic efforts of the Hayes Administration to release troops for constabulary duties
in the fall of 1878.27
The new law prompted authorities in Wyoming and Dakota territories and in Washington, D.C., to pull together to fill the void left by
the soldiers. In September 1878, United States
Marshal Gustave Schnitger of Wyoming secretly mobilized against the Black Hills highwaymen. Attorney General Charles Devens,
Schnitger's superior, afforded him $2,OOO-a
sizeable sum by the marshal's standards-to hire
additional possemen. Postmaster General David

Key dispatched veteran manhunter Charles
Adams to Cheyenne with additional funds. The
marshal deputized Adams, who then led a special posse of ten "good frontiersmen" into the
Black Hills. Since Laramie County, Wyoming,
sat astride the Union Pacific Railroad and the
Black Hills highway, Governor Hoyt reminded
the commissioners that it was "imperative that
every available means should be used" to fight
the outlaws, and that the "hearty cooperation of
all local" officials was necessary. The county
officials responded with a five-man posse. Governor Hoyt and his counterpart in Dakota Territory offered rewards for the capture of the
highwaymen. On 28 September the Daily Leader
joyfully announced, "we now feel justified in
making public" the mobilization. As the cleanup
progressed into the winter months, other law
enforcement personnel, including Nathaniel K.
Boswell, newly elected sheriff of Albany County,
Wyoming (county seat Laramie); the Rocky
Mountain Detective Agency of Denver, Colorado; and some vigilantes participated in the
outlaw roundup.28
In spite of the hesitancy of military authorities to challenge the Posse Comitatus Act,
soldiers returned in a limited way to the campaign against the frontier desperadoes. As officials in Washington sought exemptions from
the Posse Comitatus Act, officers at frontier
military posts found ways to circumvent its
restrictions. During Marshal Schnitger's dragnet for highwaymen in the fall of 1878, Post
Office Inspector Charles Adams approached
General George Crook and requested the assistance of troops in spite of the Posse Comitatus
Act. Much to Adams's surprise, Crook furloughed some soldiers whom Adams promptly
hired for his posse. Apparently the army had
circumvented other regulations in this way, and
General Crook was satisfied that no soldiers
would be punished under the Act. Soldiers in
the Southwest also concluded that they could
assist civilian lawmen-if the lawmen were
overwhelmed by white outlaws who drove them
into an army camp, a rather unlikely turn of
events. 29
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CONCLUSION

Neither frontiersmen nor historians have
appreciated the role of United States military
forces in constabulary duties in the West. In the
late 1880s historian Hubert Howe Bancroft
concluded that bluecoats "were by no means fit
to cope with [the] desperate characters" they
met in the Black Hills.
Like too many of our government servants,
they were lazy, careless, indifferent, and stupid; laborious days and sleepless nights were
less attractive than comfortable quarters and
regular potations. There was little glory in
catching [outlaws]: besides, the soldiers were
no match for them, either in activity or
intelligence. If sheriffs cannot catch rogues,
assuredly soldiers cannot. In mechanical
slaughterings soldiers do very well; if well
trained, they have not intelligence and will
sufficient to flee danger when they see it.
This is all as it should be for posts, to shoot
and be shot at; but as detectives they are of
little value. 3o
While the soldiers were by no means uniformly successful against white desperadoes, the
bluecoats made some positive contributions on
the northern Plains in the late 1870s. By 1879
the renewed offensive of civil and military
personnel had begun to reap benefits, as many
highwaymen were captured and eventually sent
to prison. While sporadic outbreaks of lawlessness continued to occur, civilian agencies assumed greater responsibility for the suppression
of such disturbances. The army's participation
diminished although it did not by any means
disappear. At the peak of the highwaymen's
activities in the Black Hills area in the 1870s,
civil lawmen became dependent upon the federal forces. The several military posts in the
region could provide many free services to civil
officials. Even when the troops failed to capture
highwaymen, their constant and methodical
pursuit perhaps kept the outlaws off balance

until local lawmen could capture them. The
mere presence of these posts and their patrols in
the wilderness of Wyoming and Dakota denied
desperadoes a sanctuary. Duncan Blackburn,
one of the most notorious of the Black Hills
bandits, once moaned that the soldiers always
seemed to be after him. These blue-coated
possemen constituted the closest partner of civil
lawmen on the northern Plains frontier in the
1870sY
NOTES

1. For early legislation concerning the army's
role in civilian peace keeping, see U. S. Statutes at
Large 1:242 (Act of 2 May 1792), and 2:443 (Act of
8 March 1807). Frederick W. Wilson's Federal Aid
in Domestic Disturbances, 1787-1903 (Washington:
GPO, 1903) is a well documented survey. See also
Homer Cummings and Carl McFarland, Federal
Justice: Chapters in the History of Justice and the
Federal Executive (1937; rpt. New York: Da Capo
Press, 1970), pp. 545-49; and for the army's duties
on public land, Roy M. Robbins, Our Landed Heritage: The Public Domain, 1776-1936 (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1962), pp. 25-26.
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